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Regional Maritime Cooperation in Maintaining 
Maritime Security and Stability: A Test Case for 
ASEAN Unity and Centrality 
 




Southeast and East Asian regions have emerged as global strategic waters. 
Yet, the seas in the regions remain vulnerable with overlapping claims on 
sea borders, piracy attacks, and other transnational challenges at sea. For 
these purposes, some major powers in the region, such as the U.S., China, 
and Indonesia, have launched their respective strategies in securing the 
maritime areas for their interests. To harmonize these various interests, 
ASEAN with its counterparts in the East Asian region needs an ASEAN-
led, inclusive, and comprehensive regional maritime mechanism and 
strategic partnership between ASEAN member states and its dialogue 
partners to maintain good order at sea. In November 2015, the East Asian 
Summit eventually launched a joint Statement on Enhancing Regional 
Maritime Cooperation to justify the centrality of ASEAN and to counter 
the failure of ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting. In such case, ASEAN 
member states need to manage their disunity to minimize hindrances of the 
realization and implementation of the plan. This paper mainly elaborates 
the reasons why the region needs regional maritime cooperation and 
discusses challenges that ASEAN has to deal with in order to implement 
the ASEAN unity and centrality in promoting maritime cooperation and 
regional stability. To explain the maritime strategies of ASEAN and its 
dialogue partners, this study uses qualitative methods and utilizes states’ 
documents as well as ASEAN statements particularly on maritime issues. 
Key words: ASEAN, maritime security, maritime cooperation, regional 
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Introduction 
Globalization depends on the free 
trade system that relies on the secure and 
free flow of goods on sea-based shipping. 
The seas are therefore essential and 
become symbol of globalization for goods 
to be distributed, sold, and consumed 
worldwide. Moreover, international 
shipping underpins the prospect of 
further beneficial growth in economic and 
world trade. But to have that effect, it 
needs to be predictable, traceable, 
compliant with detailed pick and delivery 
schedules, stable, and secure (Till, 2009). 
Having said that, the emergence of 
Southeast and East Asian regions as the 
strategic center of maritime transport is 
also associated with an increasing 
numbers of both traditional and non-
traditional threats, which particularly 
happen at sea (Prabhakar, 2006). For this 
reason, some countries in the regions, 
such as China and Indonesia, have 
published their respective initiatives to 
secure and maintain the stability of their 
sea territories. This is in addition to U.S. 
Rebalancing Strategy in Asia-Pacific 
launched in 2011, which is mainly aimed 
to secure the U.S. access in passing 
through the Strait of Malacca and South 
China Sea (Bradford, 2011; The White 
House, 2011; U.S. DoD, 2012). 
To respond the U.S. strategy, in 
September 2013 Chinese President Xi 
Jinping initially introduced the Silk Road 
Economic Belt concept, followed by the 
initiative to build a close and strategic 
cooperation between China and ASEAN 
Community, particularly in maritime 
cooperation (Xi, 2014). This is important 
as China proposes the construction of a 
21st Century Maritime Silk Road to 
promote regional interconnectivity and 
economic integration (Xinhua, 2015). A 
year later, in front of ten ASEAN member 
states and its counterparts – namely 
China, the U.S., Japan, India, South Korea, 
and Australia – Indonesian President Joko 
Widodo (Jokowi) launched the idea of 
making Indonesia as the Global Maritime 
Fulcrum. Jokowi’s doctrine is mainly 
derived from the idea that the geo-
economic and geo-political world is 
shifting from the West to the East and 
with the strategic position of Indonesia, 
the role of Indonesian seas will be 
important (Widodo, 2015). 
To harmonize the abovementioned 
strategic maritime policies, this paper 
accordingly supports an ASEAN-led, 
inclusive and comprehensive maritime 
cooperation between ASEAN member 
states with its counterparts, mainly the 
U.S. and China, that has been initiated in 
November 2015 East Asia Summit in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. “Inclusive” 
means that this partnership should be 
open and give opportunities to all states in 
Southeast and East Asian regions to 
become strategic partners and enjoy 
mutual benefit in all seas and oceans in 
the region. Whereas, “comprehensive” 
means that this maritime cooperation aims 
to resolve traditional threats related to sea 
management as well as to counter non-
traditional challenges that mainly happen 
at sea, such as transnational organized 
crimes and natural disaster. Such 
cooperative mechanism is vital as 
Southeast and East Asian countries 
mainly have common concerns to protect 
their seas and to enjoy benefits from them 
without harming other states’ interests. 
Therefore, this paper also 
elaborates the role of ASEAN, as the 
institution has become a primary driving 
force that is responsible to maintain peace, 
prosperity, security, and stability, 
particularly in Southeast and East Asian 
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regions. However, the disunity amongst 
ASEAN member states – as has happened 
in ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh, July 
2012 due to the issue of South China Sea 
management and due to China’s economic 
and military support towards some 
ASEAN members on one hand and the 
U.S. support on the other hand – is likely 
to hamper the initiative and the 
implementation of such maritime 
cooperation. Therefore, ASEAN needs to 
initially enhance the unity amongst its 
member states by fostering cooperation 
through regional mechanism and 
ensuring that cooperation on bilateral 
basis does no harm to other member 
states. 
To deeply understand the issues, 
this paper conducts qualitative 
methodology, particularly the case study 
approach, as it allows us to see certain 
phenomenon not in a single event but 
always linked to other phenomenon. The 
method often involves interaction effects 
among many structural and agent-based 
variables, path dependencies, and 
strategic interaction among large numbers 
of actors across multiple levels of analysis 
with private information and strong 
incentives to bluff or deceive other actors. 
(Bennet & Elman, 2006-2007; Mahoney & 
Goertz, 2006). Therefore, to understand 
the logic behind certain maritime strategy 
of several states, this paper utilizes their 
white papers, their leaders’ speech, as well 
as other policies and analyzes their 
behaviors from those materials.  This 
paper is divided into four parts: 
introduction, the significances of regional 
maritime cooperation, the role of ASEAN 
and how the association unites its member 
states, and eventually conclusion with 
recommendations. 
 
The Significances of Regional Maritime 
Cooperation 
W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar (2006) 
confirms in his article “Maritime Strategic 
Trends in the Asia-Pacific: Issues and 
Challenges” that the Asia-Pacific region is 
a globalized maritime environment. His 
idea implies that in the last decades Asia-
Pacific region has emerged as a global 
strategic maritime area. Nevertheless, the 
region and its seas are also vulnerable 
from both traditional and non-traditional 
threats. This part accordingly explains at 
least three notions to confirm the 
significance of the region and its maritime 
area that accordingly calls the Southeast 
and East Asian states for an open and 
comprehensive collaboration on maritime 
management. 
First, the Asia-Pacific waters, 
covering the western part of Pacific Ocean 
specifically Strait of Malacca as well as the 
East and South China Sea, have an 
abundant inventory of natural resources 
that is surely advantageous for the island 
countries. However, this situation is also 
vulnerable at the same time as a 
significant number of transnational 
organized crimes happen in the region, 
particularly at sea. Second, the need to 
protect the maritime resources and the sea 
lines of communication (SLOCs) in the 
Indo-Pacific Ocean, along with the 
increase of national economic prosperity, 
has encouraged some states to modernize 
their navies. However, this situation in 
turn provokes security dilemma1 and 
                                                           
1 Charles W. Kegley and E. Wittkopf in their 
book World Politics Trend and Transformation 
(2001) define security dilemma as “the central 
problem faced by all sovereign states in an 
anarchic global system in which a state’s 
arming for ostensibly defensive purposes 
provokes other states to arm in response, with 
the result that the national security of all 
122 Regional Maritime Cooperation in Maintaining Maritime Security and Stability 
 
creates instability in the region. 
Eventually, there are common concerns 
amongst Asia-Pacific states on their 
national economic development as well as 
regional and global stability and security 
maintenance materialized in their 
maritime strategic policies. Accordingly, 
Asia-Pacific states need a joint mechanism 
to arrange and harmonize their interests. 
With regards to the abundance of 
oil and gas in South China Sea, there are 
some assumptions and estimation on the 
numbers of undiscovered oil and gas 
resources, confirming the richness of 
western part of Pacific Ocean. In 2010, for 
example, the U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS) estimated that the South China 
Sea might contain anywhere between 5 
and 22 billion barrels of oil and between 
70 and 290 trillion cubic feet of gas. The 
Chinese National Offshore Oil Company 
(CNOOC) was more optimistic to estimate 
the potential resources in South China 
Sea. Using their own research project, in 
November 2012, they estimated that the 
area held around 125 billion barrels of oil 
and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. 
Moreover, in 2013 the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) 
launched an estimation of approximately 
11 billion barrels of oil reserves and 190 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves in 
the area (U.S. EIA, 2013). 
In addition to oil and gas reserves 
under the sea, the abundance of fish and 
other marine resources in the South China 
Sea certainly benefits states that are 
located nearby the sea. In 2010, for 
example, China’s total aquatic production 
reached more than 60 million tons from its 
Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ). The 
                                                                                    
declines as their armaments increase.” See also 
Robert Jervis (1976), Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics, Princeton 
University Press. 
production significantly increased from 
7.5 million tons in 1999, and 47.5 million 
tons in 2004 (FAO Fisheries & 
Aquaculture, 2011). The number increases 
every year, as in 2015 Chinese fisheries 
production reached 65.2 million tons and 
more than 14 million tons aquatic plants 
captured from its maritime areas (FAO 
Fisheries & Aquaculture, 2017). From the 
table below, we can see the massive South 
and East China Sea marine production 
that benefits the Southeast and East Asian 
countries. 
With its EEZ covering the Strait of 
Malacca and the southern part of South 
China Sea, Indonesia gained more than 10 
million tons of fisheries and more than 11 
million tons of aquatic plants in 2015. This 
captures made Indonesia became the 
second biggest country enjoying the 
benefits from South China Sea fisheries 
resources after China. Vietnam also 
enjoyed the massive South China Sea 
marine production as it gained more than 
6 million tons of fisheries, both captured 
and aquaculture fisheries. The Philippines 
gained nearly 3 million tons for fisheries 
and more than 1.5 million tons for aquatic 
plants, while Thailand gained nearly 3 
million tons of fisheries. The massive 
production of South China Sea 
undoubtedly becomes an endowment for 
countries located nearby the waters. 
With a proper management, 
maritime countries will enjoy economic 
development from their waters. However, 
the abundance of marine production may 
trigger illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing and other 
transnational organized crimes 
threatening any island countries that lack 
control and are weak at protecting their 
waters and its marine resources. 
According to the Indonesian Ministry of 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Indonesia 
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lost about US$23 million per year due to 
illegal fishing (Politik Indonesia, 2015). In 
order to protect its marine production and 
perform deterrence from illegal fishing 
vessels, the current Indonesian Ministry 
for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries under 
leadership of Minister Susi Pudjiastuti has 
firmly arrested more than 35 vessels with 
Chinese, Vietnamese, and Philippines 
flags by September 2015 (CNN Indonesia, 
2014). However, this robust policy has 
become a concern for the Chinese, 
Vietnamese, and the Philippines 
governments and forced them to settle 




Table 1. Southeast and East Asia Fisheries and Aquatic Plants Production, 2015 
No Countries 
Fisheries (tons)  Aquatic Plants (tons) 
Capture Aquaculture Total Capture Aquaculture Total 
 1  China   17,591,299   47,610,040  65,201,339  261,770   13,924,535  14,186,305  
 2  Japan   3,460,168   703,915  4,164,083  93,300   300,300 393,600 
 3  South Korea   1,648,993   479,360  2,128,353  7,826   1,197,129  1,204,955 
 4  North Korea   220,000   64,150  284,150  -  489,000  489,000 
 5  Indonesia   6,485,320   4,342,465  10,827,785  78,230   11,269,341  11,347,571 
 6  Malaysia   1,491,974   246,205  1,738,179  -  260,760  260,760 
 7  Philippines   2,151,502   781,798  2,933,300 367  1,566,361  1,566,728 
 8  Vietnam   2,757,314   3,438,378  6,195,692    11,822 11,822 
 9  Thailand   1,693,050  897,096  2,590,346  -   934,800  934,800 
10  Singapore 1,645 4,971 6,616 - - - 
11 Brunei 4,000 711 4,711 - - - 
12 Myanmar 1,953,510 997,306 2,950,816  2,324 2,324 
13 Cambodia 639,468 120,055 759,523 - - - 
Source: FAO (2017), World Fisheries and Aquaculture Production 
 
The second notion about the 
importance of Asia-Pacific maritime area 
is that the South China Sea and the Strait 
of Malacca are not only important for their 
marine outcomes, but also for their 
strategic position in connecting states and 
for its SLOCs. This is to confirm that the 
South China Sea, passing the Strait of 
Malacca, is significant for transportation 
and connectivity as well as trading 
system. Stretching from Singapore and the 
Strait of Malacca chokepoint in the 
southwest to the Strait of Taiwan in the 
northeast, the South China Sea is one of 
the most important energy trade routes in 
the world. The United Nations Conference 
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on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
confirmed that in 2013 approximately 30% 
of the world’s sea-based trading 
(UNCTAD, 2013) and nearly 60% of oil 
products and global liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) traveled from the Strait Hormuz 
and Strait of Malacca to South China Sea 
(U.S. EIA, 2013). 
The report from U.S. EIA (2013) 
also justified that more than 15 million 
barrels oil per day flowed from the 
Persian Gulf, through the Strait of Malacca 
and South China Sea, to East Asian 
countries as well as the U.S. In 
comparison, the world's most important 
chokepoint for maritime transit, the Strait 
of Hormuz between the Persian Gulf and 
Arabian Sea, had an oil flow of about 17 
million barrels per day in 2011. The 
number of 15 million barrels per day 
significantly increased from the last two 
decades. In 1993, according to the Center 
for Naval Analysis, about 7 million barrels 
per day of oil and petroleum products, 
which was equivalent to 20% of world 
seaborne oil trade, passed through the 
Strait of Malacca. Moreover, the Strait of 
Malacca plays important role since it is the 
main entrance and the shortest sea route 
from the Persian Gulf to East Asia. 
However, the globalized maritime 
area not only endows states with increase 
in economic development, but also 
triggers transnational organized crimes, 
which mainly happen at sea. Thachuk and 
Tangredi (2002) define transnational 
organized crimes as crime activities 
perpetrated by non-state actors that not 
only go beyond national borders but also 
have global impact. They distinguish 
transnational crime perpetrators into two 
types of non-state actors, namely terrorist 
groups and organized criminal groups. 
With regards to terrorist groups, their 
activities nowadays are more intensely 
carried out, publicly targeted, and 
globally directed. They also use the same 
methods conducted by organized crime 
groups to finance their organizations, such 
as drugs trafficking, arms smuggling, 
money laundering, human trafficking, 
and piracy. In the case of maritime Asia-
Pacific, terrorist attacks have become an 
issue since some Southeast Asian states 
have to deal with radical and terrorist 
groups, such as Indonesia, Thailand, and 
the Philippines. 
In relation to piracy threats, as 
reported by the International Chamber of 
Commerce’s International Maritime 
Bureau (ICC-IMB), there were 576 pirate 
attacks in the Strait of Malacca, 
Singaporean, Indonesian, and Malaysian 
coastal waters in 2004-2009 (ICC-IMB, 
2004-2009), nearly 36% of all piracy 
attacks in all seas around the world. 
However, the ICC-IMB in 2011 reported 
that the number of piracy crimes in the 
Strait of Malacca, Singapore, Indonesian, 
and Malaysian coastal waters had 
dropped into 240 attacks in 2007-2010 
(ICC-IMB, 2007-2009). This might have 
happened because the littoral states – 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore – had 
conducted joint patrols to protect the 
Strait of Malacca since July 2005. Despite 
the joint patrols, the piracy numbers 
increased into 631 incidents in 2010-2015 
(ICC-IMB, 2010-2015). The increasing 
number of pirate attacks off the coast of 
Indonesia, Strait of Malacca, Malaysia, 
and Singapore Strait confirms the need of 
ASEAN littoral states to protect the 
security of their waters. 
To assure the free flow of goods 
and to safeguard the oil and petroleum 
supply, as well as to protect marine 
productions and sea territory, Asia-Pacific 
states continuously develop their naval 
power. Along with the increase of 
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economic prosperity, some states in the 
region are modernizing their military 
power and enhancing their military 
budget. As China’s 2015 Defense White 
Paper confirms that the threats for China’s 
maritime areas surely come from state and 
non-state actors, the Chinese government 
plans to gradually shift its People's 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s focus 
from “offshore waters defense” to the 
combination of “offshore waters defense” 
with “open seas protection”. As its 
economy has grown over the last decade, 
the Chinese authority allows PLAN to 
build a combined, multi-functional, and 
efficient marine combat force structure. 
This is to conclude that PLAN will 
enhance its capabilities for strategic 
deterrence and counterattack, maritime 
maneuvers, joint operations at sea, 
comprehensive defense, and 
comprehensive support. 
However, PLAN modernization 
and an increase in China’s military 
spending with the justification of its 
security and defense have provoked 
similar reaction from the unhappy, 
threatened neighbors. The lack of navies’ 
arrangement coupled with their naval 
capacities in the region has also become 
another concern, as there is no mechanism 
to supervise the naval power 
development of Asia-Pacific states. 
Regarding this, Rousseau argues that the 
weak position of one’s military power 
increases the perception of threat that 
leads to security dilemma and military 
competition (Ng, 2005). In turn, military 
competition, as noted by Stephen Walt 
(1987), may trigger military alliances as 
states’ response to threats and attempt to 
prevent stronger powers from dominating 
them. This situation accordingly 
intensifies the tension amongst Asia-
Pacific states. This is true as in the case of 
Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines that 
have conducted joint military exercises 
with the U.S. as they have problem with 
China in their overlapping claims on the 
East and South China Sea. 
Eventually, the importance of 
South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca 
for sea-based trading system and SLOCs 
as well as the increasing number of 
transnational crimes endangering the 
economic prosperity in Asia-Pacific states 
have become common concerns mainly 
for Asia-Pacific states. This is not to 
mention the instability in the region due 
to arms dynamic. Their common concerns 
are derived from the willingness to 
maintain their national economic 
development as well as regional security 
and stability. For this reason, major 
powers in Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia 
such as the U.S., China, and Indonesia 
have launched their strategies either to 
safeguard their water territories and 
interests or to guarantee their access 
through the waters. 
In front of the Asia-Pacific leaders 
during East Asia Summit in November 
2011, U.S. President Obama initially 
explained the U.S. rebalancing strategy in 
Asia-Pacific to secure and protect their 
vital interest in the region. To reflect his 
intention, the U.S. 2012 Defense Strategic 
Guidance justifies the U.S. military to 
continue their leadership in promoting 
stability and security regionally and 
globally by building stronger partnership 
with capable allies. According to U.S. 
authorities, the aim of this partnership is 
to reassure that the presence of U.S. 
military personnel and capability in the 
region is to maintain peace and stability 
collaboratively, as well as to safeguard the 
access and the use of global commons 
through seas. The partnership is not only 
of the U.S. interest, but also of Asia-Pacific 
states’ interests (U.S. DoD, 2012).  
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This strategy continues under the 
Trump administration. The U.S. remains 
focused on the growing importance of the 
region, particularly for its seas and the 
freedom of navigation operations. The 
American Defense Chief, Secretary Mattis 
outlines the U.S. effort to achieve a 
rebalance to the Asia Pacific region. Some 
of the efforts are to strengthen alliances, 
encourages strong and responsible 
partners and strengthen U.S military 
capabilities in the region. Those are in 
addition to less formal networked security 
cooperation or interconnected region, to 
include bilateral, trilateral and multilateral 
exchanges, exercises and arms transfers. 
(Cronin, 2017) 
As a response to the U.S. initiative 
in the maritime Asia-Pacific, which partly 
is also performed by joint military 
operations, China has launched its 
counter-balance strategy. Since Chinese 
government is still locked in sea border 
disputes with Japan and four of ASEAN 
members – Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia – 
Chinese President Xi Jinping firmly 
declared his disapproval of the 
involvement of external powers, mainly 
the U.S. In the 2014 Conference on 
Interaction and Confidence-Building 
Measures in Asia (CICA), President Xi 
Jinping proposed a new “Asian Security 
Concept” which argues that Asian 
problems should be resolved by Asian 
people and that Asian security should be 
protected by Asian people: “<it is for the 
people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, 
solve the problems of Asia and uphold the 
security of Asia. The people of Asia have 
the capability and wisdom to achieve 
peace and stability in the region through 
enhanced cooperation” (Xi, 2014). 
Previously, in September 2013, the 
Chinese authorities also proposed a 
framework and cooperation mechanism to 
bring China, Central Asia, Russia, and 
Europe, as well as Southeast Asia together 
to build “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 
21st century Maritime Silk Road”. With 
regards to Southeast Asian countries, in 
front of Indonesian parliament members 
in October 2013, President Xi stated the 
Chinese government’s initiative to finance 
infrastructure construction and promote 
regional interconnectivity and economic 
integration by establishing the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 
This initiative is particularly focused on 
the China-ASEAN maritime partnership, 
with the basis of mutual trust and good-
neighborliness, win-win cooperation, 
togetherness, mutual understanding and 
friendship, openness, and inclusiveness 
(Xi, 2013). 
Similarly, the newly elected 
Indonesian President Joko Widodo 
declared his intention to bring Indonesia 
to become the Global Maritime Fulcrum at 
his first speech before East Asian leaders 
in November 2014 (The Jakarta Post, 
2014). The Fulcrum consists of five 
components, which are: (1) rebuilding the 
Indonesia’s maritime culture, (2) 
maintaining and managing marine 
resources, (3) developing maritime 
infrastructure and connectivity, (4) 
enhancing maritime diplomacy, and (5) 
developing maritime defense forces. With 
the fact that Indonesia lies strategically 
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans 
passing the Strait of Malacca and South 
China Sea, Jokowi’s Global Maritime 
Fulcrum doctrine shortly provoke China 
and the U.S. to approach Indonesia. Both 
countries are proposing comprehensive 
strategic partnership with Indonesia 
particularly in maritime cooperation (The 
Jakarta Post, 2014). 
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The U.S., China, Indonesia, and 
other ASEAN member states’ respective 
maritime strategies are likely to provoke 
mutual contention in the region. Yet, their 
various policies also show their common 
concerns with regards to their maritime 
territories as well as regional security and 
stability. Despite their different stances 
and capabilities regarding the issue of 
East and South China Sea management, 
all countries in the region believe that 
cooperation is vital in maintaining 
regional as well as global peace, 
prosperity, security, and stability. The 
abundance of natural resources – 
including fisheries, oil, and gas reserves – 
coupled with the need to secure their 
SLOCs and sea trading system in Asia-
Pacific waters from both traditional and 
non-traditional threats have called these 
states for cooperative management on 
such common concerns. From their 
defense white papers, we can conclude 
that ASEAN member states as well as the 
U.S. and China express their needs for a 
cooperative and comprehensive 
integrated action as well as a series of 
confidence-building measures and self-
restraint in achieving mutual interests. 
The Role of ASEAN and Challenges 
ASEAN, as one of regional 
associations in the Southeast and East 
Asia regions whose aim is to promote 
regional peace, prosperity, and stability, 
has a great opportunity to facilitate and 
accommodate its member states’ interests 
on one hand and external powers’ interest 
on the other hand in such collaborative 
way. Although ASEAN was initially 
established to enhance the economic, 
social, and cultural cooperation among its 
members as written in its 1967 Bangkok 
Declaration, security has greatly remained 
at the core of its existence (Severino, 2006). 
Indeed, former Singaporean Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew also mentions in 
his memoirs that in its development, 
ASEAN was banding together more for 
political objectives, stability, and security 
(Lee, 2000). His statement is true as in the 
case of South China Sea dispute. 
As a contending issue between 
China and four ASEAN members – 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Brunei Darussalam – South China Sea 
overlapping claims have threatened the 
regional peace and stability as well as the 
economic development. In the name of 
protection of sea territory and natural 
resources from both traditional and non-
traditional threats, claimant states 
subsequently enhance their naval 
activities. Moreover, the Chinese 
government’s rejection against the 
decision of international tribunal 
regarding the case of South China Sea 
arbitration brought by the Philippines 
seemingly failed to resolve the problem on 
the legal basis. At this point, ASEAN 
should play its central role in maintaining 
security and stability in the region. 
ASEAN has actually put its effort 
to discuss the issue in many summits and 
dialogues. The first workshop initiated by 
Indonesia was conducted in 1990 to 
manage potential conflict in the South 
China Sea. Afterwards, the issue of South 
China Sea and its management has been 
discussed every year in ASEAN leaders’ 
joint communiqués and chairmen’s 
statements. In 1992, ASEAN as a united 
posture eventually succeeded to bring 
China to sign the Declaration on the South 
China Sea, and then followed by the 2002 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea (DOC). Both 
agreements essentially called for a 
peaceful resolution of jurisdictional 
disputes by peaceful means without 
resorting to force, the exercise of self-
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restraint, possible cooperation in maritime 
safety, marine environmental protection, 
search and rescue operation, action 
against transnational crimes, and the 
application of the principles of the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation as the basis for 
a code of conduct for the South China Sea 
dispute. This was also to confirm that 
ASEAN had become a primary driving 
force institution that was responsible to 
maintain peace, prosperity, security, and 
stability, particularly in Southeast Asia 
and Asia-Pacific region. 
With regard to its responsibilities 
in maintaining peace, stability, and 
security in the region, ASEAN also has 
several mechanisms where all members 
may have dialogue and consultation on 
common political and security issues, as 
well as significantly contribute towards 
confidence building and preventive 
diplomacy.  Such mechanism is 
implemented in the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting (ADMM), and ADMM-Plus 
Australia, China, India, Japan, New 
Zealand, South Korea, Russia, and the 
U.S. as ASEAN counterparts. They are 
complement to the ASEAN Maritime 
Forum (AMF) and Expanded ASEAN 
Maritime Forum (EAMF). In these forums, 
ASEAN member states and their 
counterparts conduct dialogues on 
defense and security issues, and the latter 
is particularly for maritime issues.  
Such dialogues and security 
mechanisms are effective to build the 
confident between ASEAN members and 
its counterparts. Nevertheless, during the 
2012 ASEAN Summit in Cambodia the 
ASEAN leaders, for the first time, failed to 
reach an agreement on how to manage the 
South China Sea dispute. The debate 
continued as during the 2015 ADMM-Plus 
forum, the ASEAN counterparts including 
Australia, China, India, Japan, and the 
U.S. also failed to reach a declaration on 
the same issue (Reuters, 2015). Besides, a 
prolonged processed of South China Sea 
Code of Conduct are of signals that the 
division amongst ASEAN members 
regarding South China Sea management 
remains problematic. The partnership of 
ASEAN member states with different 
counterparts in Asia-Pacific as described 
in Table 2 is very likely to exacerbate the 
disunity of ASEAN. 
From the table below, we can see 
that almost all ASEAN countries have 
made their respective bilateral and/or 
multilateral agreements on economic, 
defense, and maritime issues with various 
external partners such as the U.S., China, 
and Japan. Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand for 
example have maritime cooperation and 
military exercise in the Exercise RIMPAC 
with the U.S., Australia, Japan, Korea, 
New Zealand, India, Canada, and the UK, 
without China and other ASEAN 
member-states in it. In trade, investment, 
and economic, Brunei Darussalam, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam are in 
cooperation with Australia, Japan, and 
Canada in Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP)-11, whereas Myanmar, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, and 
Thailand prefer to join the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) with China in the scheme. These 
partnerships contribute positively to 
ASEAN countries’ economic development 
and security, but also provoke contention 
and competition at the same time due to 
clash of their and their partners’ interests. 
Interestingly, the East Asian 
Summit (EAS) in November 2015, couple 
weeks after the ADMM-Plus, prevailed to 
launch a joint statement on Enhancing 
Regional Maritime Cooperation. This 
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statement confirmed the centrality role of 
ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms in 
maintaining the peace, stability, safety, 
and security in the region, particularly at 
its seas and oceans. This was also to 
confirm that both ASEAN and major 
powers in Asia-Pacific needed to realize 
the establishment of Regional Maritime 
Strategic Partnership and Cooperation, in 
which ASEAN becomes the primary 
driving force. This regional maritime 
strategic partnership can be an initial step 
for South China Sea dispute management. 
The Regional Maritime Strategic 
Partnership and Cooperation launched in 
November 2015 mainly discussed on 
comprehensive issues focusing on safety 
of navigation and sea dispute 
management as a way for confidence 
buildings measures. In further steps, the 
forum should also harmonize the diverse 
interests and make into realization of the 
regional maritime cooperation including 
activities such as information sharing; 
technological cooperation; exchange of 
visits of related authorities; maritime 
connectivity and capacity building; 
infrastructure and equipment upgrading; 
seafarers’ training; marine-science 
research; marine environment protection; 
eco-tourism promotion; disaster relief; 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing countermeasures; illicit 
small arms; drugs trafficking; and people 
smuggling combat; as well as security at 
sea and ports. 
 
Table 2. ASEAN Countries’ Partnerships 
Partnership ASEAN Countries ASEAN Counterparts Area of Cooperation 





The U.S., Australia, Japan, 
Korea, New Zealand, India, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
France, Norway, Peru, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Tonga, and the 
U.K. 
Maritime and military 
exercises 
Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) - 
11 
Brunei Darussalam, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Vietnam 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, Chile, Mexico, and 
Peru 








Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam  
Australia, China, India, Japan, 
South Korea, and New Zealand. 







Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam  
Australia, Canada, Japan, South 
Korea, New Zealand, the U.S., 
China, Mexico, Papua New 
Guinea, Chile, Peru, and Russia  
Economic, free trade 
agreement proposal 
East Asian Summit 
(EAS) 
Brunei, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam 
Australia, China, India, Japan, 
New Zealand, Russia, South 
Korea, and the U.S. 
Forum to discuss 
economic cooperation, 
energy, climate change, 
and internal ASEAN 
issues. 
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With such scope of cooperation, a 
regional maritime strategic partnership is 
important to enhance stability in the region. 
There are at least three reasons why ASEAN 
member states need to realize this regional 
maritime partnership. First, it strengthens 
mutual trust amongst ASEAN countries, as 
it will be a mechanism in which ASEAN 
countries speak as one united actor. Second, 
the partnership builds common perception 
between ASEAN countries and its 
counterparts in Asia-Pacific, particularly 
with China regarding the South China Sea 
management. Eventually, with mutual trust 
and common concern between all parties, 
the partnership gradually reduces the 
tension in the region relating to South China 
Sea issue and other maritime managements, 
as they will collaboratively resolve the 
problems, both traditional and non-
traditional challenges. 
Nevertheless, this regional maritime 
partnership can be a test case for ASEAN 
unity and centrality. As a regional 
organization, ASEAN’s main task is to 
accommodate its diverse member states’ 
interests and capabilities. Moreover, as a 
unified actor in the region, ASEAN needs to 
harmonize its member states’ interest with 
external powers’ interest. It is complicated 
for ASEAN especially after experiencing its 
first years of ASEAN Community. In such 
case, ASEAN member states need to build a 
common perception amongst them related 
to conflicting issues with a basis that they 
have common concern on the same issues. 
Besides, as an organization, ASEAN needs 
to ensure that its member states’ respective 
bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation do 




The importance and vulnerability of 
Southeast and East Asia region, coupled 
with its maritime security, has urged major 
powers in the region to launch their 
respective maritime and defense strategies 
which are important to promote national 
prosperity and security as well as regional 
stability. As a united actor in the region, 
ASEAN should also play its role according 
to its responsibilities by looking at common 
concerns of its members and counterparts. 
With regards to the South China Sea issue, 
ASEAN has conducted some internal 
mechanisms to resolve the problem, yet it 
failed to achieve an agreement on the issue. 
However, external ASEAN-led mechanisms 
can be utilized to resolve the sea dispute. To 
speak as one united actor, ASEAN should 
perform its leadership and centrality in 
Regional Maritime Partnership and 
Cooperation, involving other pacific states 
and ASEAN counterparts, mainly China, 
South Korea, Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand, and the U.S. By this, ASEAN 
needs more confidence-building measures 
to build common perception with common 
concern amongst its member states and to 
ensure its member states get no harm from 
their respective bilateral and/or multilateral 
partnership with external powers. 
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